Our argument has been that without a liberal democratic framework, neither economic nor social changes advance with stability and continuity, without provoking social discontent. From an essentialist view, liberal democracy would be culturally neutral, universalistic, and possess a humanizing political order in spirit as well as in its philosophical moorings.

The main elements of this essentialist view would include constitutionalism, true representative government, rule of law through impartiality of the judiciary, and legal and political accountability of public office holders. Undoubtedly, it is the only peaceful and proven political route to resolving old issues of locating and adjusting religion and politics in Muslim societies. Contrary to popular interpretation of liberalism in Pakistan, much touted by ill-educated media persons and conservative religious sections, liberalism is not against any religion. On the contrary, philosophically and historically, it considers religion as a fundamental unbridgeable right.

Two liberal ideas make the conservatives uncomfortable. First, it is the equality of all religions and equal rights of all persons to pursue the religion they wish to, including the choice of not professing any religion at all. Second, is the issue of social choices that some individuals make that may run counter to some of the dominant social ideas; this is true whenever freedom of choice counters a dogmatic view of life. Such social cleavages are inevitable and part of the historical process of change and continuity, which requires a culture of pluralism and appreciation of difference as a mark of freedom. In fact, the rule of law, justice, and individual rights despite being a Western historical experience, are very close to Islamic ideas of just society, just social order, and a just individual. 11 Pakistan in particular had a huge positive endowment of modernist political ideas, institutions, and practices that the colonial state building process had left in the Subcontinent.

Therefore, unlike Afghanistan, Central Asian states, and most of the Middle Eastern Muslim states, Pakistan started with a rich historical foundation and not with meager institutional inheritance. The point we have tried to examine and emphasize in this book is how feudal oligarchic and military elites diverted Pakistan from that inheritance and perverted political institutions to sustain their respective authoritarianism.

What we have argued is that by breaking this cycle of authoritarianism, Pakistan can get back to constitutionalism and rule of law tradition, which would serve as essential institutional tools for the electoral elites to obtain social and political support to counter the raging forces of radical Islam. Who has a greater stake in the renewal of the country and how best can it be done are debatable points and may invoke different responses from different quarters, domestic as well as international. In our view, the

, particularly its civil society, the professional associations, and the more politically aware sections have the primary responsibility of redirecting the country on the path of modernity.

The common man in Pakistan, honest and hardworking, has a stake in the constitutionalist and democratic Pakistan, and he has, within his social limits and capacity, always tried to put the country on this track. It is a simple calculation, the revival of Pakistan as a moderate, peaceful state would mean a better future for the people and their coming generations; on the other hand, radical Islam will isolate the state and society from the world, create conflict among various social groups, and keep society chaotic, as has been the case on at least the fringes with frequent incursions into its heartland.

FORCES OF HOPE | multiple challenges to Pakistan’s economy

Despite facing multiple challenges Pakistan’s economy, political institutions, and state machinery have survived many crises and rejuvenated. A good example of this is bouncing back from the lowest point in its history when it lost one-half of the country in 1971. Pakistan represents conflicting and confusing trends of chaos and order, pessimism and optimism, corruption and integrity, failures and successes.

The trends make it clear that neither its direction nor its path has been chosen carefully, and those ruling it have had little wisdom, prudence, and vision. The most remarkable contrast is between a failing state and a very resilient society that continuously manages to fill the gaps left by the state through philanthropy and private initiatives. In contrast to other countries, it is the private sector that is a model for the state, instead of the state being a model for the private sector. In the 1960s, it was other way around when the state showed the way to the private sector. Practically, both complement each other, and the state plays a big role in regulation as well as in enforcing some standards. The progress of Pakistan, overall, has not been dismal after all the failures and problems that we have examined; it could have certainly done better.

Neither is the syndrome of chaotic order or ordered chaos irreversible in Pakistan. There are already some forces of hope that have emerged as a consequence of economic and social change. These include the rise of the middle class, free and proliferating media, emergence of vibrant civil society, and a successful transition to democracy. Pakistan’s gradual takeover by a coalition of bureaucratic-military establishment and feudal oligarchy has begun to provoke an intellectual, social, and political reaction from the middle class and civil society. The emergence of a large middle class both in the rural and urban areas, which is estimated to be 80,000,000 strong, roughly 44 percent of the population is a result of relative modernization, urbanization, and the political economy of immigrant workers.12 What is the relative power and position of the new social forces and how they might be instrumental in reshaping the political identity of Pakistan from praetorian-feudal oligarchy to a constitutional democratic state, is an important question.

They have great potential and are the only bottom-up force of change. The social location of these forces is of great sociological and strategic significance, as they are articulate, urban, and professional, and they are politically autonomous of the traditional power structures. They have also developed a strident voice on national issues, particularly on making Pakistan a truly representative democracy, seeking an impartial process of accountability, and pursuing a responsive government that delivers.

The issue of rights, from women to minorities and marginalized groups, is far more visible today in social debates and political circles than one could think of a few decades back. These are some of the signs of new activism that may take society to the next stage of social and political development, on the route toward reconstructing Pakistan as a true liberal-democratic state.

The rising power and influence of the new social forces of the country were reflected in the social movement for the restoration of an independent judiciary (2007–8) against emergency rule imposed by Pervez Musharraf, and in the removal of checks on media. The groups associated with the dominant structures of power and privilege, directly or indirectly, take a pessimistic view of the new social forces by generally denying their existence or by interpreting their ideas about social and political transitions as too idealistic. In doing so, they take a structural view of social change, believing that the ruling groups using their dominant social and political position would continue to manipulate the political process the way they have done in the past.

In our view, history and social change do not run in circles but move forward with the pace depending on vision, social energies, and quality of leadership. The vision, energies, and leadership of the new social forces can make a positive contribution to a progressive and reform-oriented Pakistan. With the emergence of new social forces, the power to determine the path for Pakistan is no longer reserved for the traditional classes—the feudal oligarchy and dynastic political parties. There is clearly a three-way contest over capturing the soul of Pakistan, among the traditional ruling classes, Islamists, and the new social forces. However, neither the social boundaries nor the ideological lines are clearly drawn among the contesting groups. Members of these roughly drawn categories and their sub-layers may support Islamists or traditional classes. What is salient and interestingly a new phenomenon is a trend of the new social forces toward a liberal and

An even bigger change is in the reorientation of the security establishment of Pakistan from aligning itself with the Islamists to going after the radical militant outfits. The security establishment’s choices for a liberal project is because of the threat militant radical Islam poses to the country, and the security establishment’s bitter experience of fighting this menace. The civil society, media, and professional associations represent the new reformist and progressive outlook of the new social forces for Pakistan. They have been engaged in the long war of ideas and continue to focus their efforts on catalyzing a rule-bound, moderate, and open society. Some of its members, the activists, have paid a heavy price by losing their lives at the hands of the militants.

Even big losses have not silenced these voices of change. Even though Pakistan continues to be a divided society and remains polarized on vital issues, the liberalist vision, which is articulated through the politics of rights and demands for accountable and responsible representative government, and less by philosophical exegesis in Pakistani social climate, adds a positive dimension to political pluralism. The struggle for a truly representative and constitutional government is as much an intrinsic character of the new middle classes as it is a form of political resistance against radical Islam and the feudal oligarchy, and it is bound to serve both ends. For the new social forces of Pakistan this is an imminent struggle that they can neither put on hold for the next generations, nor leave to the broadly de-legitimized oligarchic, dynastic political rulers.

The new social forces rightly fear that the alternative to the traditional ruling classes of Pakistan is Islamic radicalism; and while they have managed to retain some dignity and rights under autocratic rules they would lose everything under any form of Islamic/religious theocracy. There can be legitimate questions about the strength of the new social forces to set Pakistan on a democratic-constitutionalist path, but to question their existence or to say that they can easily be cornered, would be a misreading of Pakistan’s changing social and political scene. Generally, the discourse in Pakistan and abroad focuses on radical Islam, militancy, and the oligarchic-military elites, but the activism of the new social classes gets little or no attention. The strength of the new social forces lies in the open debate that happens on media about every issue from a narrow local one to broad national problems, and also on the platforms of the of civil society organizations that have emerged in every part of the county with tens of thousands.

Owing to advancements in technology, they are better organized, better skilled and have found many ways of expressing themselves, organizing protests when necessary and voicing their concerns and point of view on the media. Increasingly, high visibility of leaders and activists of the new social forces has gradually transformed them into a vital social and political element. The extent to which their views and ideas are accommodated in mainstream politics, legislation, and policy formulation is another matter.

Their success and relevance in policy making will depend on the nature of issue, coalition building, and the instruments they use to influence public policy or legislation. So far, the progress is slow and has had small achievements. A major reason for stifling the voice of new social forces is the patronage politics of traditional ruling classes; they have created an underworld of journalists, public intellectuals, and media mouthpieces to defend their brand of politics and policies through using public resources. A section of the media functions as an essential appendage of the old social order with the primary task of defending it. Such media persons take a recognizable conservative view of social change, spread pessimism about new forces, and glorify even the most corrupt dynastic politicians. They often try to disorient the debate on the media and attempt to drown voices urging for a just and participatory society through the pretext of tradition and religion.

The expansion of the space for voices of feminists, minorities, marginalized ethnic communities and the urban middle classes has provided an effective channel of political communication that cannot easily be suppressed by the apologists of the dynastic political classes. Interestingly, Pakistan’s ruling elite classes are abundantly familiar with liberal ideas and institutions and they are also aware of the transformative power they may have on society. The reason they resist the liberal, democratic and constitutionalist ideology of the Muslim modernists is out of the fear that rights, justice and equality, would upset the traditional social and political order that works in their interest.

No dominant social class in history has 194 Chapter 8 given up its privileged position without a struggle. In every social setting, no change has ever come about without a persistent struggle against the old dominant classes who have tried to preserve existing systems. The dialectics of change and resistance is an old story of human civilization; Pakistan is no exception to it. The Pakistani elites are oblivious to the emerging social resistance against them and live in the delusion that they can defend themselves and their corruption, misrule, and poor record of governance.

This may not be possible as in the age of open and free mainstream media and social media that have national and international outreach. There is a popular disgust with the rule and role of the traditional political establishment. The over-confidence of the Pakistani elite rests in their history of getting away with massive corruption and political manipulations, which has made them blind to the changing co-relations of forces. Driven by the dynamics of constituency politics based on patronage, the individual parliamentarian is not sufficiently bothered by the loud voice of critique of the present hybrid political order based on authoritarianism and procedural shades of democracy.

He knows that the public vote works along narrow family, caste, and tribal lines with social networks being more important than the character and ideology of the candidate. The new social movement of Pakistan wants to block radicalization by transforming the country into a true democracy with fair political and judicial accountability of public office holders. Their interest is contesting and blocking the influence of radical Islam through liberal ideas of democracy, which they believe are also in the interest of the old ruling classes of the country.