longest and costliest wars waged by Pakistan | today article

 The radical Islamists have forced upon Pakistan an unavoidable war, which has been one of the longest and costliest wars waged by Pakistan. It is the war to re-establish the writ of the state; but it is also a war of ideas, between militant radical Islam and the democratic constitutional political order. For stability and national unity, Pakistan will have to recover its lost moderate identity. In our view, there are three essential means to win this war gradually but consistently.

 The first is the significant role of the security forces that will prove instrumental in defeating radical Islam, as this requires continued use of force. Pakistan’s security forces have made tremendous gains in this war and have succeeded in destroying the mini fiefdoms of the Taliban. Similarly, the civilian governments and parties have also been successful in reaching a consensus with the military and among each other on the National Action Program to end extremism and terrorism. 

Most important, there has been a change in the “ally” status of the radical Islamists who are no longer considered by the security establishment as resources, as had been the case in the past where they were encouraged and supported to assist the Taliban in Afghanistan and militants in the Indian-administered region of Jammu and Kashmir.24 There are, of course, skeptics in Pakistan and outside the country that argue that the distinction between “good” and “bad” Taliban still is made in some strategic calculations.  However, there is a visible clash between the Pakistan which wants to revive, stabilize, and achieve progress and the proponents of radical Islam that thrives on creating a chaotic and conflictridden country. 

The radical Islamists have a religion-based ideology, fixed agenda, and inflexible worldview. Previously, the Pakistani state had a strategic interest in using such groups as proxies. Till the interests of the two converged, the state allowed them to recruit, train, equip and send fighters across the borders. This practice continued for more than a decade not only in Pakistan but also in the Middle East where radical Islamist elements shared Pakistan’s interest in defeating the Soviet Union. However, as subsequent events have revealed, their motives and political interests were not bounded by time or events. The Islamists had bigger objectives to pursue—liberation of all Muslim lands perceived to be occupied by non-Muslim powers, challenge American power in the Middle East, and capture power in the Muslim states by all necessary means. 

These policies have had deep and un-ignorable backlash for Pakistan. The second important means to win this war is the changing perception of radical Islam among the people of Pakistan. Pakistani society is moderate at its core and has never been extremist as in the image of radical Islam, which itself is an unintended consequence of Islamization at home and fallout of the Afghan wars. Public opinion has never been with the Taliban or the radicals. In the wake of hundreds of acts of terrorism the local population, and the  general public opinion, have turned against the Taliban and Talibanization attempts quite decisively. This has also put the religious parties that used to defend the Taliban in the media and the mosques on the defensive, at least in their public appearances. These achievements are important first steps, but Pakistan has a long way to go toward recovering itself from religious militancy. 

This will require sustained efforts of reconstruction in the war-affected zones in the tribal region and an initiation of thoughtful political, legal, and administrative reforms to bring these areas in the national stream. The bigger task is introducing wider structural reforms in every area of national life. Problems, from an informal criminal economy to the justice system, are so deep and complex that no government or leader has found enough courage or support of the fellow political elites to address them head-on. Complacency and expediency has driven the Pakistani public to hopelessness and pessimism, generating distrust of the political authority, the state, and the political process. 

The democratic governments will have to perform better on development, governance, justice, and equality to re-establish the trust of people. This is essential to prevent the disillusioned young falling into the hands of the radical elements. Finally, the ideas for reshaping Pakistan cannot be different than those that have engendered good society, progress, and prosperity in other parts of the world. We know that the historical and cultural context within which modern ideas have to be situated and rooted is important. Some of these ideas, such as religious pluralism, tolerance of other faiths, scientific inquiry, and rational outlook have always been part of the Islamic heritage and civilization. The Pakistani state bears great responsibility toward recovering some of these elements as universal values. 

Pakistan needs more clarity about its national identity as a pluralistic Muslim majority state with a greater focus on pursuing modernity within the framework of constitutional democracy. This means equal rights for all ethnic, religious, and regional categories. This process may help the country resolve many contradictions of identity politics that have crept into debate as well as policy areas, domestic as well foreign policy and national security issues. The real energies and political will for reviving or transforming Pakistan will have to come from within, but at the moment, it cannot succeed without international support and cooperation.

 Why should the international community, primarily the Western countries, be interested in nudging and assisting Pakistan in strengthening its democracy, rule of law, and development policy areas? The answer is simple; a democratic, modernist, and progressive Pakistan would remain integrated with the globalizing world and would be a peaceful regional player with its interests tied to material benefits. In view of the central place Pakistan occupies both in the battle of ideas between modernity and radical Islam and between regional stability and conflict, reviving the Pakistani state and society is a necessity, and no longer a choice. Reviving Pakistan is hence not only in the interest of its own citizens as a self-interested community, but also a primary concern of the international community. 

The wars in Afghanistan, from the Soviet occupation to the American “liberation,” have had a large role to play in the kind of resistance, radical thought, and movements their actions have produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The world has a pragmatic interest in supporting the state and critical social forces of Pakistan in structuring identity and improving governance and economy. It is not a misplaced fear that Pakistan’s current and future troubles may spill over to other Muslim states in Central Asia and the Middle East, just as their conflicts have spilled over into Pakistan. This assessment is not a conjecture but based on hard facts of transnational radical movements and their networking beyond into the Western world. We know how the socially alienated Muslim youth in Europe has found inspiration in the state-less regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has received training and support from the terrorist networks residing in these countries. 

 Therefore, the identity and character Pakistan takes in the coming years will matter for the stability or instability of not just its own society but also for many others in adjacent Muslim regions and beyond. Pakistan is once again on the crossroads and confronts stark choices between the disorder that forces of radical Islam have produced and the ideal of human and material progress. As we have argued, Islam and the Islamic way of life, as traditionally understood and practiced in the Subcontinent, has never been in conflict with empowerment of individuals and groups or with the general idea of a progressive reform-oriented state and society.

 However, within reformist, revivalist Muslim thought, there have been two streams since the pre-independence era, that is Islamic revivalism and modernity. In the South Asian context, the two have found areas of convergence and conflict. The convergence is on empowerment, rights, and general concerns about failures of the Muslim community, but the conflict is on the means of identity, achieving progress, and relational issues with other communities. Pakistan was the dream of Muslim modernists and the achievement of their struggle, which also included convincing a good section of the Islamic revivalists to join the Pakistan movement. In this book, an attempt has been made to answer two fundamental questions: how Pakistan lost track of modernity and social progress, and why its identity and destiny have become nebulous, if not entirely disputed. Today, Pakistan does not have leaders with the strength, conviction, and moral fiber of Jinnah but embracing his ideas and those of other Muslim modernists would bring peace, stability and the economic progress. 

Putting Pakistan back on the road of becoming a moderate state is a challenge especially in the shadow of three long cycles of war in Afghanistan and the rising wave of radical Islam throughout the Muslim world. The  growth of trans-border and transnational terrorist networks has blurred the lines between the first wave and the other two waves of political Islam. But we believe that the balance is still in favor of the modernist inheritance that can be defended and further recovered and strengthened by internal reforms and international cooperation. 

The challenge of radical Islam is not just a national issue; it is regional and in many ways global, as we have witnessed emergence of radical elements in the heart of the modern European world among the disaffected Muslim youth. While Pakistan has no other option than showing resolve, especially as the military continues its operations against terrorists, it will have to achieve more progress on its national reform agenda. Education, health, economic restructuring, and governance are the most critical areas that will define the future of Pakistan. Stephen P. Cohen, who has studied and written about Pakistan extensively aptly remarks that “an educated population can be greater asset than oil or mineral resources, of which Pakistan has little, in any case.”  The future growth and progress of Pakistan lies in building organic links across all regions and areas of Pakistan through improved performance in vital areas of social development, economic opportunity, equal rights, and recognition.

 This will restore faith in the democratic political order and develop it further to become people-centered. The real challenge therefore stands in the realm of ideas—how to re-establish the salience of pluralistic, tolerant Islam, and a deeper faith in a constitutional democratic order by making it inclusive and responsive. This is a long road to the “promised land” of peace and progress, but it has to be traveled, better sooner rather than later.